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Last year The Colonial Lawyer attempted to place
greater emphasis on alumni of the law school. It
was our feeling that the professional activities and
accomplishments of alumni were of interest to students and faculty as well as other alumni. The responses received from individual alumni have been
pleasing and, in some cases, flattering to the editorial staff.
As the emphasis on alumni coverage increased,
so did questions concerning the propriety of serving
an alumni audience with a magazine financed entirely by student funds. This year the College Board
of Student Affairs, feeling that this publication should
be financed partly from other sources, reduced The
Colonial Lawyer budget by approximately thirty-five
per cent. When this budget cut was made, the Editorial Board asked the Student Bar Association's Director of Alumni Relations to explore the possibility
of obtaining additional financing from the law school
alumni organization. The Director later reported that
the alumni organization, as a matter of policy, would
not provide financial support for any student publication.
This financial situation has caused the Editorial
Board to reconsider the role of The Colonial Lawyer

in the law school community. Because this publication is financed solely by student funds and also because the alumni organization publishes its own newsletter, we concluded that it was improper to provide
alumni coverage at the students' sole expense. We
also concluded that our alumni coverage might at
times duplicate material appearing in the alumni organization's newsletter. Consequently, this issue will
be the last one mailed to alumni. We hope that the
alumni organization will pass on to the students and
faculty of the law school newsworthy items of alumni
achievements and activities.
This issue of The Colonial Lawyer offers several
articles which will be of interest to both the present
law school community and alumni alike. An article by
third-year law student Edward Flippen examines the
effect of local zoning ordinances upon mobile-home
ownership. Assistant Professor Joseph A. Miri of the
Department of Government, College of William and
Mary examines the proposed reorganization of Virginia's environmental agencies. Several present and
former Marshall-Wythe law students were instrumental in the drafting of this legislation. Finally, The
Colonial Lawyer presents an article by Law Professor
William F. Swindler in which he discusses the proposed organization and activities of the National Center for State Courts which is to be located in Williamsburg.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING ORDINANCES
WHICH EXCLUDE MOBILE HOMES
EDWARD L. FLIPPEN, third-year
law student, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law

The problem of local zoning ordinances which
preclude mobile homes from locating within the
borders of a municipality is part of a larger subject,
i.e. exclusionary zoning, often referred to as "snob
zoning." Whether it is the city excluding public
housing, modular or mobile homes, or the suburbs
legislating one-, two- or even four-acre lot sizes, requiring minimum floor space, or banning apartments
in toto, the objective of the political unit is often to
exclude housing that could be used by the poor'
At a time when "snob zoning" laws are being used
or enacted with greater frequency for exclusionary
purposes, the Nation's need for low-cost housing has
never been greater. Commencing about 1966, the
gap between demand and supply of basic housing requirements began developing into a chronic national
problem. More than two million units are needed
each year, one-half million alone to replace demolished housing. Yet actual construction has averaged
only 1.3 million units.' Coupled with an inadequate
supply have been high inflation and construction labor
shortages, all resulting in increased costs of conventional housing' Consequently, families with annual
incomes in the vicinity of $8,000. are most often
precluded from the conventional market since housing in most parts of the country which this income
group can afford—$15,000. or less—is generally
no longer being built.* Therefore, to meet the housing
needs of lower economic groups, it is anticipated
that, by 1978, 26 million new and rehabilitated lowcost housing units will be needed.'
One of the major sources of low-cost housing to
emerge during the last decade has been the mobile
home. In 1969, 33 out of every 100 new single
family dwellings were mobile homes, retailing for
approximately $6,000. which includes furnishings'
Doubles range from $8,000. and up and provide on
the average 1,368 square feet of interior space, as
much as a fair sized single-family house and more than
most apartments' With the cost of conventional
housing moving upward, placing more and more persons out of the new housing market, the importance
of the mobile home can readily be seen, since it provides low-cost yet adequate housing'
2

To aid in solving the well-documented fact that a
shortage in housing is one of the most critical problems confronting the United States, the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968 authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
to subsidize or directly finance a total of four million
new housing units to be started by 1978, and to assist
in the rehabilitation of two million additional units .°
To stimulate industrialized mass-production of lowcost housing, HUD has spent or will spend over 50
million dollars on Operation Breakthrough. 1° From
over 1,000 business and nonprofit groups came a
total of 630 mass-production proposals, and of this
group 22 business concerns were selected to build
more than 2,000 units of modular or mobile type
-homes."
But Operation Breakthrough has been embroiled in
controversy from the start. Citizens' groups have rebelled at the prospect of low-income projects in their
neighborhoods." The attitude of these citizens' groups
is that the allowance of any form of low-cost housing
in a neighborhood will turn it into a slum. Consequently, the ultimate weapon of the exclusionists has
been snob-zoning which permits only single-family
homes to be built on relatively large one- or twoacre lots. The argument that resounds forcefully at
most rezoning hearings is that exclusionary zoning
helps preserve the "quality of life" of the political
units. In other words, higher population densities invariably produce higher rates of crime, welfare and
pollution."
The major problem emerging from the rapid expansion of mobile homes is that local homeowners
fear being located within close proximity to these
dwellings. Complaints abound that the trailers erode
property values, create a greater than average strain
on public revenues, provide lower property taxes because of the lower tax base," and invariably require
higher public expenditures for schools (an item that
already comprises the largest portion of most communities' budgets) because of the fact that trailers
are inhabited by more children than the norm."
Even though there has been legislative recognition
of the imperative of decent housing" and the United

"

States Supreme Court has on at least five occasions
proclaimed that housing is a "necessity of life." 27
muchostilyabendrcowmbileh
owners. Usually, the hostility is implemented in zoning ordinances which exclude, in some fashion, mobile homes from the local community."
The issue, therefore, is the constitutionality of laws
which, in the face of national policy and national
needs, exclude housing which to date is the only expansionary form of decent housing available to lowincome groups.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING
The issue of constitutionality of zoning per se
needs little attention at this date. In 1926, the now
classic case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company" reached the Supreme Court, where it was
held that zoning ordinances were valid. To be unconstitutional, zoning provisions must be "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare."" The strong presumption of constitutionality was reiterated by the court in 1928 in its
last pronouncement dealing with the constitutionality
of a zoning ordinance." Of course, the constitutionality of an ordinance also depends on its being
authorized by the state constitution or legislative
enabling statute and its not being in conflict with
federal enactments.
DUE PROCESS
Because of the strong presumption of validity, a
due process attack on an exclusionary zoning ordinance encounters a formidable obstacle. Zoning
ordinances serve legitimate goals of city planning and
are justified on the assumption that in the absence of
regulation, private pursuit of self-interest in the land
market will result in a net "social loss" to the community as a consequence of the imposition of external
economics upon the property adjoining that of the

individual. Thus, the theoretical objective of zoning
ordinances is to eliminate this assumed discrepancy
between the private entrepreneur and the interests of
the community. In order to accomplish this objective,
zoning ordinances divide the community into districts and permit only "compatible" land uses to locate on adjoining parcels." But rather than provide
for compatible land uses, zoning is often used as an
exclusionary device to condemn the poor to live in
the urban core" or conversely, to preserve the
"quality of life" in the small town or suburb. Whether
the exclusionary tool of zoning is a denial of due
process is (1) a matter of fact, to be determined on
a case by case basis, and (2) quite candidly, a matter
of judicial preference and attitude about legislative
discretion.
Fairfax County, Virginia, which contains over 4.00
square miles and 258,000 acres of land, is declared
to be the fastest growing county in the United States.
Its rapid growth has created problems of an inadequate sewer system, water supply, fire protection system and school system. Consequently, the Board of
Supervisors enacted zoning amendments requiring
two-acre minimum lot sizes. Upon review, the Virginia Supreme Court repeated the so often used judicial test, to wit:
. . . the legislative branch of a local government
has wide discretion In enacting and amending zoning
ordinances. Action is presumed valid so long as not
unreasonable or arbitrary . . . [the] burden is on
him who assails it to prove that it Is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that It bears
no substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. The court will
not substitute its judgement for that of a legislative
body ... If reasonableness of the zoning ordinance
is fairly debatable 2 1

Nevertheless, the court went beyond the alleged
legislative purpose and determined that the practical
effect of the ordinance was to preclude low-income
groups. The court held that such an intentional and
exclusionary purpose would bear no reasonable relation to the health, safety, morals and general wel-

•••

the Nation's need

for low cost housing
has never been
greater."

3

fare, but would serve private rather than public interests:"
The mere power to enact an ordinance does not
carry with it the right to arbitrarily or capriciously
deprive
ry.2po6te a person of the legitimate use of his

The Virginia court has also held that aesthetic
considerations alone may not justify police regulations." Aesthetic considerations are, of course, one
major reason why some believe it necessary to exclude mobile homes.
Due process attacks against zoning ordinances
which make no provisions for multiple-family dwellings,28 which prohibit outdoor moving picture
theatres,29 which prevent the use of land as an undertaking
establishment," or ordinances which refuse to grant
rezoning essential to the erection of low-rent housing
projects," trailer parks," or quarrying" have been
sustained. But each zoning case litigated on due
process grounds involves a different set of facts and
circumstances upon which the constitutionality of
the zoning ordinance must be tested." In each case
the test of validity is the reasonableness of the ordinance viewed in light of existing circumstances in
the community and the physical characteristics of the
area." However, where the purpose behind the enactment has not borne a substantial relation to the general welfare, especially where restrictions indicate an
attempt to bar "undesirables" from a particular area,
due process arguments have been used successfully
in attacking such ordinances.
In 1970, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
failure to provide for apartments anywhere in the
township of Nether Providence was unconstitutional
and unreasonable per se, indicating that the burden
of persuasion had been shifted to the municipality."
Obviously the township had the right to preclude
apartments, but if the general public interest in apartments outweighed the interest of the municipality, the
township's enactment would be an unreasonable exercise of legislative power.
4

In effect, Pennsylvania is applying a substantive
due process analysis allowing the applicant to show
that a proposed land use is legitimate, then shifting
the burden of proof to the municipality to establish the
legitimacy of the prohibition by evidence of what
public interest is sought to be protected."
Two of the more profound cases against exclusionary zoning in Pennsylvania arose out of attempts
by townships to freeze the population and protect
the aesthetic nature of the area by prohibiting multiunit apartments" or enacting minimum lot sizes."
The decision of the township that it was content with
things as they were, and that the expense or change
in character that would result from people moving in
to find a comfortable place to live was unacceptable."
The Pennsylvania court held that ". . . no community
can be allowed to close its doors to others seeking
a comfortable place to live." 42
In 1969, in Will County, Illinois, the governing
body excluded mobile homes. In a due process attack
on the ordinance, the court considered:
(1) existing property uses,
(2) whether mobile homes would diminish property values,
(3) whether mobile homes were the most appropriate use of the property,
(4) need for low-cost housing in the area,
(5) length of time the property in question was
vacant, and
(6) suitability of the property for the zoned purposes."
The evidence clearly rebutted and overcame the socalled presumption of legislative validity. Relying on
an earlier Illinois case the court concluded:
... when it Is shown that no reasonable basis of public welfare requires the limitation or restriction . . . ,
the ordinance fails and the presumption of validity
is dissipated.**

Where zoning ordinances restrict mobile homes to
specific districts, courts generally agree that such restriction is valid." Where there are zoned districts
for mobile homes but the properties are being used
for other purposes, the fact of such existing uses for
other purposes does not, of itself, serve to render the
zoning ordinance a ban on trailers altogether and
hence invalidate the ordinance." Conversely, jurisdictions regularly uphold zoning ordinances excluding mobile homes." New Hampshire Supreme Court
holdings along these lines have been commonplace,
and in 1957, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared that the right of a municipality to place trailers
in certain zones or totally exclude them is wellsettled, even to the point of exclusion within one mile
of the municipal limits of Raleigh."
In 1959, a Connecticut Court left to the legislative

authority the power to determine if the geographical
situation and the resources of the municipalities
would be overtaxed if mobile homes were allowed.
Under this scheme the only test would be reasonableness." On the other hand, a Michigan court, rather
than leaving it to a legislative determination, found
it unreasonable to exclude a use from property that
was undeveloped and surrounded by undeveloped
property in a sparsely populated township. The controlling legal principle in the latter case is recognition
that the zoning ordinance restricting an owner's use
of his land must bear a real and substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals and general welfare.
It was incumbent upon the township to show some
facts from which a relationship between the zoning
of the property and the proper exercise of the police
power could be inferred, whereas in the former case
the test of reasonableness only related to the legislative stipulation—not the facts inherent in a given
case."
The difference in the two types of cases is basically the degree of presumption attached by the
courts to legislative enactments. Does the governing
body merely have to show that its ordinance is reasonable in relation to the general welfare, or must it
prove, by facts, a substantial relationship to the general welfare before an exclusionary ordinance will be
upheld?
In essence, successful attacks on due process
grounds will in all cases require a showing of facts
that constitute unreasonableness on the part of the
political unit. Nevertheless, ultimate success will
depend upon whether some form of a substantive due
process test is used, balancing the interests of the
municipality against those who are denied an otherwise lawful property use.

EQUAL PROTECTION
The fact that exclusionary zoning laws segregate
people on the basis of their economic status cannot
be refuted. Because of their limited financial means,
many individuals are denied access to the housing
and facilities of a community in which they desire to
live and perhaps work. 51 The effect of such segregation may possibly be an illegal classification, using
the new equal protection analysis. Consequently,
equal protection is the central legal argument against
exclusionary zoning.
Traditionally, to determine the legality of a classification, courts have applied the rational basis test,
with municipalities justifying their ordinances simply
by showing a reasonable relation between the purpose of the ordinance and the general welfare."
However, where the classification results in discrimination with respect to a right of very great

importance, such classification will not be sustained
merely because it has a rational basis. If the state
fails to supply a substantial justification, its discrimination is deemed "invidious" and unconstitutional.53 Whenever legislation is based on inherently
suspect criteria, the burden falls upon the state to
justify such enactments. Lack of substantial justification, which requires the showing of a "compelling
state interest," renders the law unconstitutional."
The major problem in an equal protection attack,
which involves shifting the burden of justification
and triggering the compelling interest test, is whether
or not the legislation creates a suspect classification.
More specifically, does the exclusion of mobile homes
which may result in de facto wealth discrimination
constitute a suspect classification and thus require
the public authority to show a compelling state interest? 55
Beginning in 1942, the Supreme Court has put the
onus on the state to do the justifying in cases where
discrimination emerged against disadvantaged
classes" and where the classification was in derogation of a basic or fundamental right. For example, in
1966 the Virginia poll tax requirement was held unconstitutional. The court declared:
We have been long mindful that where fundamental
rights and liberties are asserted under the equal
protection clause, classifications which might invade
or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and
carefully confined . . . , wealth or fee paying has in
our view no relation to voting qualifications: the
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be
so burdened or conditioned 5 1

In effect, the court declared restrictions on voting
to be a suspect classification since the restriction infringes on a fundamental right. Of course, the equal
protection clause permits the states to make classifications and does not require them to treat different
groups uniformly. It is only where the classification
results in invidious discrimination of a fundamental
right that the burden of proof shifts and the state is

EDITOR'S NOTE
This article will appear in the
Spring 1974 issue of the American
Business Law Journal.
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required to show a "compelling interest."
The State of Virginia adopted miscegenation
statutes to prevent marriages between persons solely
on the basis of race. The court reiterated that the
traditional rational basis test is to be applied in
ascertaining the foundation of a classification, the
effect being to defer to the wisdom of the legislature.
However, where the statute, as here, creates a racial
classification, the classification is inherently suspect
and ". . . will be subjected to the most rigid
scrutiny." 58 In this context ; New York, until 1968,
denied welfare assistance solely on the ground that
recipients had not lived in the state for a year. The
state justified the waiting period as a device to preserve the fiscal integrity of the public assistance
programs of the state. However, the Supreme Court
on review held that ". .. the right to travel from one
state to another . . . occupies a position fundamental
to the concept of our Federal union." Since the
classification here was aimed at excluding welfare
recipients from the state and touched on the fundamental right of interstate movement, the court declared that its constitutionality must be judged by
the stricter standard of whether it promotes a "compelling" state interest."
A New York Education Law provided that those
who were otherwise qualified to vote in federal elections may vote in school district elections only if:
1. they own or lease taxable real property in the
school district, or
2. are parents or have custody of children enrolled
in the local public schools.
Upon review, the court began by disregarding the
traditional rational basis test and the presumption of
constitutionality usually afforded state statutes. The
denial of the right to vote was recognized as the
denial of a fundamental right, causing such classification to be suspect, Therefore, the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interest which the state
claims to be protecting and the interests of those who
are being disadvantaged must be considered, with the
classification being allowed to stand only if the exclusion is necessary to promote a compelling state
interest. The court held that:

the "effects" of the enactment and sustain an equal
protection attack against an enactment which effects
racial classifications. In all probability an attack in
this instance would be successful because of the
nature of the exclusion. In reality, however, even
though blacks are predominantly in the lower socioeconomic group the exclusion of mobile homes does
not classify on the basis of race but rather more
along the lines of economic status. To shift the burden of proof then, where no racial classification is
effected by the enactment, there must be a factual
showing involving (1) infringement of a fundamental
right, or (2) classification by wealth or economics.
Where the enactment is an attempt to limit the size
of a city, possibly it is an infringement on the right to
travel since the overall purpose of population limitation is to defer the influx of new residents, creating
a barrier to the free flow of persons. 6 ' Arguably, this
is analogous to the invalidity of certain welfare residency requirements," a classification which was
deemed to constitute invidious discrimination touching on the "fundamental right" of freedom of movement. It is certainly arguable that a municipality
which restricts migration into the city has a more
substantial effect on freedom of movement than do
welfare residency requirements.
There are sufficient legislative and judicial proclamations declaring that housing is a necessity of life
to enable the courts to hold that a classification
which excludes certain types of housing is suspect
under the Equal Protection clause." However, the
courts to date have not held such to be a fundamental interest requiring such protection." Absent
proof that an ordinance excluding mobile homes infringes upon the right to travel, that housing itself is
a fundamental right, or facts that demonstrate de
facto segregation, an equal protection attack must be
made on the basis of an economic classification.
In 1968, welfare recipients were denied admission
to public housing that was managed by a private corporation but financed by a Federal Housing Administration. The court held that classification solely on
the basis of status as a welfare recipient was an arbitrary classification in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." In an Illinois case, but by way of
dictum only, the Supreme Court said:

. . . the Nauss is not whether the legislature's judgement is rational. The issue is whether . . . the requirements do in "fact" sufficiently further a compelling state interest to justify denying the franchise
to appellant and members of his class. 60

. . . where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth
or race, two factors which would independently
render a classification highly suspect, an exacting
judicial scrutiny is especially warranted. 66

Does the exclusion of mobile homes constitute invidious discrimination? Obviously it would if the
facts and circumstances showed that the effect was
to exclude all blacks, or a similar class, because only
they lived in mobile homes. The court, regardless of
the legislature's motive, upon review would look at

In 1970, thirty acres of land were purchased in
Lackawanna, New York. for the development of lowincome housing. Immediately the city amended its
zoning ordinance to declare a moratorium on approving subdivisions. The city claimed that increased
(Continued on page 13)
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Coming: The National Center For State Courts
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary

The locating of the headquarters of the National
Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, announced
in August at the time of the American Bar Association convention, promises a variety of benefits, both
tangible and intangible, for the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law. Williamsburg was chosen after a
screening of applications of more than a dozen cities
throughout the country, and apparently the two overriding practical advantages in its favor were (1)
proximity to national government in Washington and
(2) existence of the outstanding conference facilities
in Williamsburg.
Among the specific advantages to the Law School
in association with the National Center will be cooperative library acquisitions, in which the Law Library will make its resources available in exchange
for access for research purposes to the special reference collections of the Center. When the Center's
conference and training programs are fully operational, law students are expected to be called upon to
serve as ad hoc clerks for visiting jurists engaged in
the study projects built into the programs. Faculty
and staff of the Law School will probably have opportunity to participate in Center research projects
from time to time.
It is also anticipated that various professional and
scholarly agencies working in the general field of
court administration will establish branch offices or

liaison programs at the Center headquarters. Such
groups include the American Judicature Society of
Chicago, the Institute of Judicial Administration in
New York, and the National College of the State
Judiciary in Reno, Nevada. The headquarters staff
itself, once the building is completed and the national programs are fully functioning, may range from
fifty to one hundred persons.
The National Center is only beginning to formulate
its program of activities, but among them will probably be conferences and training programs for various types of court personnel, organization and funding of research projects, and collection and publication of studies on court administration and law reform. For the present, the work of the National
Center will be implemented in various regional offices,
three of which are already operating in Atlanta, San
Francisco and St. Paul, Minn. At least two other
regional offices, in the southwest and the northeast,
will be added to the structure.
Edward M. McConnel, former State court administrator for New Jersey, is now the executive director
of the National Center. Justice Louis H. Burke of the
California Supreme Court and Justice James A. Finch,
Jr. of the Missouri supreme court are president and
vice-president, respectively, of the Center's board of
directors. The first meeting of the board in Williams-

(Continued on page 13)
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VIRGINIA ATTEMPTS TO REORGANIZE
ITS ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES
JOSEPH A. MIRI; Assistant Professor
Department of Government
College of William & Mary
To the end that the people have clean air, pure
water, and the use and enjoyment for recreation of
adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources, it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth
to conserve, develop, and utilize Its natural resources, its public lands, and its historical sites and
buildings. Further, it shall be the Comonwealth's
policy to protect Its atmosphere, lands, and waters
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the
benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people
of the Commonwealth.
(Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Virginia)

Since ratification of the new Constitution by the
citizens of Virginia in 1971, the General Assembly
has enacted several major pieces of legislation concerned with environmental quality in an attempt to
fulfill the Constitutional mandate. Among them have
been the 1972 wetlands legislation, the establishment
of a Council on the Environment, legislation aimed at
identifying and protecting "critical environmental
areas," the Erosion and Sediment Control Law and
the requirement of environmental impact statements
on certain construction undertaken by State agencies.
in terms of the Commonwealth's commitment to a
coordinated attack on environmental problems, however, the most important legislation introduced during the past several years was House Bill Number
1586, introduced in the 1973 Session of the General
Assembly. This bill represented the culmination of a
study by the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council
(VALC) first initiated in 1971, when House Joint Resolution Number 35 of that year directed a study of
"the desirability of establishing a single State agency
to regulate and control all environmental pollution."
The study was undertaken by a select Committee on
Environmental Management, composed of members of
the VALC and in January of 1973 the Council reported its recommendations to the General Assembly
and Governor.
In that report the Council noted five general deficiencies "which have impaired the effectiveness of
environmental management in Virginia." I First among
these is the duplication of effort under the existing
arrangement of independent agencies. The shellfish
protection program, for example, has required the
technical services of five separate agencies and has
been marked by much duplication of water sample
collection and analysis. Likewise, plans for new
sewage treatment facilities have involved double
8

processing by the State Water Control Board and the
Bureau of Sanitary Engineering of the Department of
Health.
Second is "the fragmentation of properly unified
environmental functions among several different administrative agencies" 2 and the lack of coordination
which results. The Council cited disagreements between the State Water Control Board and the Bureau
of Sanitary Engineering stemming from the different
criteria used by each agency in reviewing plans for
sewage treatment plants, and the conflicts between
the Water Control Board and the State Corporation
Commission over minimum flow releases for new
dams, the VALC pointed out that at present "there
is no single agency which is either capable or authorized to take a broad look at and act upon the
needs of environmental protection. Policy and standards are necessarily established in bits and pieces for
specific media. No single board or official can act on
environmental questions outside its narrow area of
concern." 3
Fragmentation was also found to have resulted in
a third problem: the neglect of certain regulatory
functions due to the absence of coordinative supervision which could fill in such "gaps." Here the
Council singled out the failure to make on-site inspection of new sewage treatment plants.
A fourth problem is the numerous delays in administrative action on environmental permit applications which result from (1) fragmentation of responsibilities; (2) the requirement that part-time
commissions decide on permits and (3) a lack of
specific accountability for permit processing.' Although the specific example given involved the
Marine Resources Commission, the report reflected
a general concern over the need for approval from
several agencies, each making its own investigation,
before some projects can proceed.
Finally, the VALC cited the "increased involvement of boards and commissions in the day-to-day
management of agencies, largely due to insufficient
delineation of responsibilities." 5 The Council referred to the blurring of administrative and policymaking functions in some instances and appeared to
be opposed to providing day-to-day leadership of an
agency through a collegial body rather than a single
administrator Direct involvement in the running of
an agency by a board or commission often leads to

confusion on the staff and a great reduction in the
speed with which an agency can act.
To remedy these problems, the Council recommended a massive reorganization of the State's environmental agencies into a single department placed
administratively under the general jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Commerce and Resources.
Under the provisions of House Bill 1586 as originally introduced, there would be established the Department of Conservation, Development and Natural
Resources. The Department was to be comprised of
four divisions, each headed by a director: the Division
of Environmental Quality; the Division of Natural
Resources; the Division of Game and Inland Fisheries;
and the Division of Marine Resources. In proposing
to establish these new agencies, the Council took
cognizance of the different categories of environmental
functions. One broad type is pollution control, which
has been carried out by relatively new agencies and
has as its prime goal the enforcement of standards
and regulations to maintain environmental quality.
The other broad category is resource conservation
and development, which has traditionally had as its
major concern the development of the state's natural
resources.
The Division of Environmental Quality was to combine those existing agencies and functions which
were primarily concerned with pollution control.
Specifically, this would mean abolition of the existing
State Water Control Board and Air Pollution Control
Board, and the transfer of their functions, along with
certain functions of the Department of Health, to the
new division.' The Division would be divided along
lines suggested by its combined components into the
three bureaus of Air Quality, Water Quality and Solid
Wastes.
The existing Department of Conservation and Economic Development was to form the basis of the

proposed Division of Natural Resources. This Division
would carry out the essentially conservation and development functions in resource management and
consist of four bureaus: Forestry and Minerals; Parks
and Recreation; Mined Land Reclamation; and the
Bureau of State Travel.
Because of the "inherently close ties between
wildlife preservation, land acquisition and management and other aspects of environmental management," " the third unit of the proposed Department
was to be established by the abolition of the Commission of Game and Inland Fisheries and the transfer of its functions to a newly created Division of
Game and Inland Fisheries. Similarly, the Marine
Resources Commission would be abolished and reestablished as the Division of Marine Resources, the
last of the four divisions. In conjunction with the
establishment of these four divisions, House Bill
1586 also established four citizen boards along the
same functional lines as the divisions. The Board of
Environmental Quality was to be comprised of seven
members: the Commissioner of the State Health Department and, initially, the three senior members of
both the existing air and water boards. The Board of
Natural Resources was to be comprised of twelve
members, with the initial membership that of the existing Board of Conservation and Economic Development. Similarly, the proposed Board of Game and Inland Fisheries was to be selected as is the present
Commission (ten members, one from each Congressional district) and was to be initially comprised of
the current membership of the Commission of Game
and Inland Fisheries. The present membership of the
Marine Resources Commission would comprise the
initial Board of Marine Resources, which would number seven merbbers.
These four boards were to have several things in
common. All were to be appointed by the Governor

HOUSE BILL
A BILL to amend and reenact § 2.1-51.9 of the Code of Virginia; and to further amend the
Code of Virginia by adding in Title 10 a chapter numbered 1.3, consisting of sections
numbered 10-17.31 through 10-17.56, the amended and added sections relating to and
providing for environmental management in State government by creating a
Department of Environmental Protection and revising and reallocating functions of
certain State agencies involved in this field; appropriations therefor.
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and confirmed by the General Assembly. Their functions were to be limited to the power to establish
broad policies and adopt standards and regulations
concerning matters under their respective purviews.
They were not, however, to become deeply involved
in day-to-day administration. Each Board would elect
its own chairman and establish rules for its internal
organization. Staff support would be provided by the
Commissioner of the Department .°
Of particular importance in the overall reorganization scheme embodied in House Bill 1586 was the
establishment of a single administrator, the Commissioner of the Department, on whom previously
fragmented administrative responsibilities would be
centrally focused. He was to be appointed by the
Governor and confirmed by the General Assembly for
a term of four years, such term to run concurrently
with that of the Governor. "The duties and authority
of the Department, unless expressly assigned by law
to a Board shall be performed and exercised by the
Commissioner, who shall be the head and chief executive officer of the Department." 10 These duties included (1) the maintenance of an environmental
quality monitoring network; (2) determination of the
Department's budget, including sub-budgets for each
of the four divisions; (3) administration of all funds
available to the Department; (4) application for federal aid and cooperation with federal agencies in
implementation of federal programs; and (5) giving
advice to the Governor and General Asembly ". .. on
matters relating to environmental quality and natural
resources ..." and measures deemed "... necessary
to enhance the quality of the State's environment. . ."
The Commissioner was given power to appoint the
Division directors, who were to serve at his pleasure,
and to "reorganize or abolish any Bureau, create .. .
new Bureaus, and otherwise establish ... (the department's) . . . organization . ." including the adoption
of rules and procedures for internal management."
Of equal if not greater importance than his administrative control over the Department, the Commissioner also would have the power to "issue, deny,
revoke or modify, in accordance with duly adopted
standards, policies and regulations, any and all permits, licenses and certificates that may be required
by law."" He could "develop . . . organizational
capability for evaluating proposed projects and programs" and "consolidate, coordinate and expedite"
permit procedures, "ensuring that any formal hearings required are consolidated into one such hearing."" Thus, he would possess the power to begin
to coordinate the awarding of the numerous environmentally related permits presently controlled by
separate boards and commissions.
As a "check against arbitrary administrative action on permit applications," 15 the bill established an
10

Environmental Appeals Board, to consist of the chairmen of the four citizen boards and the Secretary of
Commerce and Resources, who was designated Chairman. Further review of a decision of the Appeals
Board would lie in the courts."
As originally proposed, then, House Bill 1586
would have represented a considerable step toward
genuine consolidation of existing environmental agencies. Although the concept of citizen boards was retained, the functions of these boards would be limited
to the establishment of policies and the adoption of
standards and regulations. The authority to manage
the day-to-day operations of the department was
clearly left in the hands of the Commissioner. The
bill represented a fairly clear delineation of functions
and authority and an effort to focus accountability for
the State's environmental policies.
However, opposition to the measure, particularly
from affected agencies, forced extensive changes in
order to improve its chances of passage. As a result,
the Environmental Coordination Act of 1973, which
was ultimately passed and signed by the Governor,
did not embody the basic reorganizational concepts
of House Bill 1586.
That Act provides that the Department of Conservation, Development and Natural Resources will
consist of five divisions; the Division of Air Pollution
and Solid Wastes; the Division of Water Resources;
the Division of Natural Resources; the Division of
Game and Inland Fisheries; and the Division of Marine Resources. Within the Division of Air Pollution
and Solid Wastes, the Act establishes two bureaus:
the Bureau of Air and the Bureau of Solid Wastes.
Within the Division of Natural Resources five bureaus are established: Forestry, Mineral, Parks,
Mined Land Reclamation, and State Travel. The citizen boards remain as established in the original bill
with the exception of the Environmental Quality
Board .
Under the provisions of the amended bill, the
present membership of the State Water Control Board
is designated the Water Resources Board and the
present membership of the State Air Pollution Control
Board becomes the Air Pollution and Solid Wastes
Board. The Commissioner of the State Health Department, as in the original bill, becomes a member of
each of these two boards.
The most important change in terms of the relationship between the divisions and their corresponding
boards is the broadening of the powers and duties of
these boards at the expense of those of the Commissioner. Under the provisions of the amended measure, the five boards will now have the power to (1)
approve their own budgets ("each of which . . . shall
be approved by the appropriate Board and thereafter
shall be submitted by the Commissioner as approved
to the Governor");" (2) appoint the directors of their

respective Divisions, who will serve at the pleasure of
the board:" and (3) exercise the power of administrative review over actions of the Commissioner, including the power to initiate review on their own
motion."
The amendments to the bill, then, represent a considerable erosion of the powers originally vested in
the Commissioner and as such greatly reduce the
prospects for genuine coordination and accountability. Under the terms of the Act each director reports "to the Commissioner and shall perform such
duties as are assigned or delegated by the Commissioner or as required by other provisions of law," 2°
yet these directors will be serving at the pleasure of
the respective boards. Moreover, whereas in the
original measure there appeared to be a clear delineation of functions and duties and a clear focus of
responsibility, the possibilities for genuine coordination and effective management of the Department are
seriously weakened by the amendments. Nowhere

standards and regulations." 22 To effectuate such
review, the law provides that each Board "shall be
empowered to initiate review on its own motion and
any final action of the Board taken thereafter shall
constitute agency action for purposes of judicial review." 21 Thus, whereas in the original bill a single
appeals board was provided for, which would combine the interests of the individual boards and render
a single decision or "agency action," the amended
bill leaves open the possibility of several such "actions."
Although the Commissioner retains many of the
duties assigned him in the original bill, including the
authority in multiple permit projects to "consolidate,
coordinate and expedite" permit procedures"* the
wide discretion left to the individual boards could
deter any efforts at coordination.
On balance, it would appear that the deficiencies
noted in the VALC report have not been uniformly
addressed by the passage of House Bill 1586. The
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does the act clearly delineate what the boards will
do and what the Commissioner will do to accomplish
the goals of the Act.
A rather broad mandate for coordinated action is
set out in the Act:
It shall be the duty of each Board to coordinate its
actions with all other Boards in the Department in
order to insure that all policies, standards, rules and
regulations of the Department are internally consistent. To this end, the Commissioner, in conjunction with the Chairmen of the Boards, shall work to
establish such procedures as may be necessary to
achieve this coordination. 21

However, the Act does not compel this cooperation
and allows for conflicts among boards, which could
not be resolved at the agency level.
For example, the law specifies that each Board
"shall possess and exercise the power of administrative review . . . over final actions of the Commissioner in the specific area or areas in which each
Board is authorized to establish policy and adopt

Clerk of the Senate

bill does not appear to come to grips with several
basic issues, especially those involving retention of
the numerous boards, agencies and commissions,
versus the single administrator, or unified department.
concept. The problem of accountability for the implementation of Virginia's environmental goals, policies
and programs has not been squarely addressed; coordination of these goals, policies and programs has
not been assured to any significantly greater degree
than now exists.
In addition to these substantive revisions, proponents of the bill tried to respond to the concern of
the House Committee on Conservation and Natural
Resources and the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Conservation and Natural Resources, to which the
bill was referred, that there had been a lack of input
from agencies and citizens during the formulation of
the proposal. To allow for such input, a series of
public hearings was scheduled throughout the State
during the summer of 1973. To facilitate future
amendments, an expiration clause, was adopted
11

which provided that "this act shall be In force on
and after July one, nineteen hundred seventy-four,
and shall expire at midnight on July one, nineteen
hundred seventy-four, unless it shall be reenacted
by the General Assembly prior to that date." 25 This
assured that the General Assembly would be afforded the opportunity to reconsider environmental
reorganization at its 1974 session and could accept,
modify or reject the concepts embodied in the
measure. In conjunction with passage of the bill,
the General Assembly also approved House Joint
Resolution Number 265, which directed the VALC
to continue its study of the consolidation of environmental agencies, along with other aspects of
environmental problems. Finally, Governor Holton
appointed an agency task force to formulate a position on the measure as passed and suggest possible
alternatives.
During the course of the public hearings on the
Act, it became apparent that there was little support
for the measure. Some felt that the Act goes too far
in consolidating existing agencies; some felt that it
does not go far enough in ensuring genuine consolidation. A number of counter-proposals were offered,
including the creation of an Environmental Protection Agency which would combine only those functions related to air, water or land pollution control.
Such an approach was endorsed by Governor Holton.
A second proposal would establish an Administrator of Environmental Affairs to coordinate environmental policies and procedures with existing agencies, boards and commissions retaining their present
autonomy and authority. This alternative was proposed by the State Water Control Board and was
preferred by the Governor's task force appointed to
study House Bill 1586.
In a recent development, the VALC has recommended to the 1974 Session of the General Assembly
that a slightly modified form of the Administrator
approach be followed. The VALC has now suggested
that: (1) House Bill 1586, as amended, be reenacted
with an effective date of July 1, 1975, provided that
it is once again reenacted prior to that date; (2) in
the meantime, the position of Administrator be created and that he be designated chairman of the existing Council on the Environment with power to bring
about coordination of environmental activities; (3) the
membership of the Council on the Environment be expanded; and (4) the VALC continue its study of environmental management in Virginia.
Under these recommendations, the Administrator
is given basically the same powers possessed by the
Commissioner of the Department of Conservation,
Development and Natural Resources under the
amended version of House Bill 1586. Except for the
expansion of the Council on the Environment to in12

dude the Commissioner of the Health Department
and the Chairmen of the Board of Conservation and
Economic Development, the Game and Inland Fisheries Commission and the Marine Resources Commission, and the transfer of the Council from the
jurisdiction of the Secretary for Administration to the
Secretary of Commerce and Resources, the structure
of existing agencies remains the same.
This lack of structural change is the major difference between the amended House Bill 1586 and the
current proposal and it appears to be the primary
reason for the support from existing agencies which
the Administrator approach enjoys. Whether this
means that the General Assembly will follow the
VALC recommendations is still unclear, but pressure
is considerable to enact some form of reorganization. Developments at both the state and national
levels increasingly point to the necessity of addressing environmental problems in a comprehensive
manner. The General Assembly may find it more
difficult than it has been in the past to avoid resolving
this problem.
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EDITOR'S NOTE
At the time of this printing the
ultimate fate of this legislation is yet
uncertain.

COURTS CENTER (from page 7)
burg since selection of this site for the permanent
headquarters was held November 16-17, along with
a meeting of the National Council of State Court
Representatives, an advisory group of delegates from
each of the fifty states.
The Commonwealth of Virginia, through Governor
Linwood Holton, made an offer of approximately ten
acres of land on the old tract of the Eastern State
Hospital, opposite the Williamsburg-James City courthouse. The Commonwealth also agreed to help with
the raising of funds for the construction of the headquarters facility, and the Center has engaged Hubert
Jones, a member of the Richmond architectural firm
which has designed many of the College buildings, to
prepare plans for the facility. It is estimated that construction will take about two years, and will begin as
soon as plans are approved and funds are assured.

ZONING ( from page 6)
sewer needs, park and recreational needs, and flooding
problems justified the amended ordinance. However,
the court said that where the effect of state action is
to place upon a minority group a special burden of
classification, the public authority has a heavy burden
of justifying such classification—that is requiring the
showing of a compelling state interest, a test which
in this case the city failed to meet." Certainly there
was a very reasonable basis for the city's action, but
by shifting the burden of proof it was not enough for
the city to show reasonableness but a compelling
state interest which included a "duty" on the part of
the city to consider and affirmatively plan for lowincome housing. The court declared that "if the
plaintiffs are deprived of equal housing opportunity,
the result is the same whether caused by open, purposeful conduct, by a subtle scheme, or by sheer
neglect or thoughtlessness." 88
In effect this court considered housing a fundamental right, the denial of which created a suspect classification or, alternatively, that the exclusion of lowincome persons is a suspect classification.
The Supreme Court has implied that economic
groups such as the poor are protected by the Fourteenth Amendments' and that in the absence of a
showing of a compelling justification, discrimination
based on economics is invidious and violates the
equal protection clause." At least one lower federal
court has held that since exclusionary zoning strikes
most heavily against the poor, a classification based
on wealth is suspect 71 Even though there are various holdings that stipulate or by way of dicta imply
wealth to be a suspect classification, one very recent
Supreme Court case almost entirely rejects such conclusion. Article XXXIV of the California Constitution

requires that before any low-income public housing
can be constructed anywhere in California, the development must be approved by the community in a
referendum vote. Upon being challenged, Article
XXXIV was held, by a three judge panel, to be a denial
of equal protection. The panel started with the
premise that the conjunction of race' with poverty
was sufficient to justify treating classifications based
on wealth or poverty as if they had been race alone,
hence "constitutionally suspect" and subject to a
heavier burden of justification than other classifica-

tions."
However, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 3
decision because no racial classification was involved. The implication may well be that the majority
of the Court is prepared to tolerate discrimination
based on economic criteria." If so. attempts by public
authorities to exclude the poor may be safe from
equal protection attack.
In a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Blackmun and Brennan (Justice Douglas did not
participate), Justice Marshall stated:
It is far too late in the day to contend that the 14th
amendment prohibits only racial classifications; and
to me singling out the poor to bear a burden not
placed on any other class of citizens tramples the
value that the 14th amendment was designed to
protect...."

Apparently the desire of the dissent to use judicial re-

view to stamp out evil classifications by application
of the "compelling interest test" will have to give
way to the ordinary "reasonableness" or "rational"
basis standard. Certainly the James v. Valtierra decision does not rule out an equal protection argument
against zoning ordinances which exclude mobile
homes. The case could be distinguished and limited
to the facts therein. Referenda are an integral part of

California's history and commonplace in the political
life of the state, 76 being used for Constitutional
amendments, the issuance of municipal bonds, and
authorization for municipal annexations," as well as
for the approval of low-rent public housing projects.
Consequently, it is at least arguable that within California the right to participate in the decision making
process by voting is so fundamental that in balancing the interests, the Supreme Court will require
more than a wealth classification before enjoining the
referendum system.
Absent a limitation of the holding to the uniqueness of the California system, some allegation which
speaks to more than merely exclusion of the poor will
have to be presented—specifically, infringement on a
basic right. However, there are no black and white

lines as to what is a basic right, and whether such
right is being restricted still seems to depend in part
on the disadvantaged character of the person claim13

Ing the right." And, no doubt, the equal protection
clause will be extremely flexible upon review of a
legislative classification. Nevertheless, absent any
showing of facts or circumstances other than economic classification, the Supreme Court would most
likely apply the rational basis test.
REGIONAL APPROACH
Some case decisions, notably in Pennsylvania, but
also in New Jersey, New York and Virginia, show a
trend toward an implied duty on the local zoning authority to consider the interests of all the persons in
the area of the state." The New Jersey Supreme
Court in declaring a zoning ordinance invalid because it aimed at excluding low-income families from
undeveloped areas, held that the ordinance failed to
promote a balanced municipality in accordance with
the general welfare of the larger geographical region."
In Delaware County, Pennsylvania, the Town of
Concord enacted exclusionary zoning ordinances
aimed at keeping out low-income families. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that the overall
solution to zoning lies with greater regional planning;
and the Court was firm in its commitment to require
neighboring communities to work with each other until
legislative enactments imposed regional authorities
on local political units." Meanwhile, across the
Delaware River, two developers in New Jersey who
owned vacant land in the Township of Madison, and
six low-income individuals who resided outside the
town, sought to set aside a zoning ordinance which
had the effect of barring a mobile-home park because of one- and two-acre minimum lot requirements. The highest court of New Jersey held that:
. . . in miming the valid zoning purpose of a balanced community, a municipality must not ignore
housing needs . . . Housing needs are encompassed
within the general welfare. The general welfare does
not stop at each municipality's boundary. 82

In effect, the court said that local zoning must be
based on regional needs.
One of the earliest of several cases expanding the
responsibility of the municipality beyond its local
borders and holding that a municipality had to zone
with sensitivity toward its neighbors arose in New
Jersey in 1954. There the court squarely faced the
issues of regionalism versus the concept of "home
rule" and whether the right of self-government gives
local units the right to zone solely in their own interests. There the court held in the negative," but it
is hard to deny that there is an essential conflict between the assumption that zoning is a local matter
and the fact that in metropolitan areas, governmental
boundaries are of almost no socioeconomic signifi14

cance." Obviously, general welfare does not stop at
each municipal boundary.
If the power of the state legislature to legislate is
accompanied by the duty to consider the interest of
all the people of the state, then the delegation of
legislative powers of the state to local units of government must, by necessity, be accompanied by the
imposition (express or implied) of a duty to exercise
such delegated power with the interests of all the
state's citizens in mind." Nevertheless, the doctrine
of "home rule" pervades the legislatures and courts
alike. Few enabling acts and few courts direct local
zoning authorities to zone for the welfare of all the
people of the region or of the state. Whether "regional general welfare" will give opponents of exclusionary zoning a legal weapon has not yet been
determined.
CONCLUSION
Success in overcoming zoning ordinances which
exclude mobile homes depends to a large extent on
providing sufficient data and logical arguments that
such exclusion is not in fact necessary for the public
welfare—that is, it ,must be shown that the questioned ordinance is not within the limits of necessity
for the protection of health or general welfare. In
each case the test of validity will be the reasonableness of the ordinance viewed in light of existing circumstances in the community and the physical characteristics of the area affected or to be affected.
If the constitutionality of such ordinances is to be
decided in a jurisdiction applying a substantive due
process test, then upon showing that the proposed
land use is legitimate, the burden of proof will shift
to the municipality, requiring it to establish the legitimacy of the prohibition by evidence of what public
interest the ordinance attempts to protect. Jurisdictions not applying a substantive due process test will
merely test the ordinance in light of its reasonable
relation to the stipulated legislative purpose. In these
latter cases it appears that by attacking such ordinances, from the standpoint of due process, the
judicial forecast appears bright. Whenever the ordinance effectuates racial discrimination or in some
way infringes upon a basic right, such as freedom of
movement, the legislation will be deemed suspect,
with the burden of proof falling hard upon the state
to show its compelling interest. Inasmuch as mobile
homes are predominantly purchased by members of
low income groups, the effect of an exclusionary ordinance may result in de facto wealth discrimination,
a classification held suspect by many courts, thus
requiring justification by showing a compelling state
interest. However, the case of James v. Valtierra,
supra, implied a willingness on the part of the United
States Supreme Court to tolerate certain economic

classifications. The effect, if the implications are correct, might be to diminish the value of the equal protection clause as a means of attacking exclusionary
zoning laws which segregate individuals and groups
by income.
The most effective weapon to mitigate the effect of
exclusionary ordinances and promote a balanced
community lies with the respective state legislatures
imposing upon local governing bodies a duty to enact
ordinances with the regional general welfare in mind
rather than merely concern for the public welfare
within given municipal boundaries. Unfortunately,
with few exceptions, the courts have not imposed a
duty on the local zoning authorities to consider the
interests of all the persons in the extended area,
including that which lies outside the local political
boundaries.
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